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Abstract. The ProVotE project aims at actuating art. 84 of law 2 –
5/3/2003, which promotes the introduction of e-voting in Trentino for
the next provincial elections (2008). To provide a smooth transition to
the new way of voting ProVotE takes a multi-disciplinary approach that
develops along different lines, among which, sociological, normative, or-
ganizational, and technological. Carrying out an election is a critical ac-
tivity that involves several people of different organizations over a period
of time that spans months. This paper describes part of the work carried
out within the organizational/logistical line of the ProVotE project and
describes the approach we are taking in order to provide precise mod-
els of the electoral processes of an electronic voting, while, at the same
time, providing mechanisms for documenting, reasoning on the possible
alternative implementations of the procedures to support the elections
of 2008. In particular, the approach is based on defining an alternating
sequence of models, written using UML and Tropos, that allow to docu-
ment the existing electoral processes and, at the same time, that are used
to reason, evaluate, and choose possible alternative implementations of
the electronic voting processes.
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1 Introduction
Art. 84 of PAT (Autonomous Province of Trento) Law 2/2003 mandates the
introduction of e-voting for the next provincial elections (to be held in 2008).
To actuate the law, the Province is sponsoring the ProVotE project, that has
the goal of providing a smooth transition to the new technologies. The project
develops along different lines, among which the process/logistical line, that aims
at defining the procedural, organizational, and normative framework that will
regulate an electronic election.
Electoral procedures involve different organizations, several people over pe-
riods of months, and have strict security and traceability requirements. This
paper describes part of the work carried out within the process/logistical line of
the ProVotE project and describes the approach we are taking in order to pro-
vide precise models of the electoral processes, while, at the same time, providing
mechanisms for documenting, reasoning on the possible alternative implemen-
tations of the procedures to support the elections of 2008. In particular — in
order to cope with the complexity of the domain — we defined a methodology
based on the UML for modelling the electoral processes and we show how we
are complementing such a methodology with the usage of Tropos, in order to
reason about process alternatives and therefore provide means to trace choices
in devising the electoral “to be” processes.
Broadly speaking, the idea of integrating UML and Tropos is not new (see e.g.
[15]). In the literature, however, most of the efforts have been directed toward
the combination of the two approaches to provide a uniform methodology to
support software development (e.g. start from early requirements in Tropos and
move to UML when it is time to do the “concrete” design). Our approach differs
in the sense that the UML and Tropos are used independently to achieve different
and complementing goals. In particular we stick to the UML as the notation to
formalize procedures and processes (both “as is” and “to be”), whereas Tropos
is used at the meta level to provide a formal link between the “as is” and the
“to be” processes. The goal-orientation features of Tropos allow to reason about
possible alternatives and thus provide a visual way of formalizing why, among
all the possible alternatives, we choose specific ways of implementing the “to be”
procedures.
In Sect. 2 we will briefly present the project under which scope this work has
been developed; in Sect. 3 the main features of our proposal are explained, while
in Sect. 4 these same features are illustrated in more details with the help of the
examples. Finally, in Sect. 5 we draw the conclusions and sketch some possible
future developments.
2 The Scenario: e-Voting and ProVotE
2.1 The ProVotE Project and Motivations
ProVotE has the goal of ensuring a smooth transition to e-voting in Trentino,
eliminating risks of digital divide and providing technological solutions which
support, with legal value, the phases ranging from voting to publication of the
elected candidates.
The project includes partners from the public administration (Provincia au-
tonoma di Trento, Regione Trentino/Alto-Adige, Consorzio dei Comuni Tren-
tini, Comune di Trento, IPRASE), research centers and academia (ITC-irst,
Faculty of Sociology of the University of Trento, Fondazione Graphitech), and
local industries (Informatica Trentina) and is co-led by the Electoral Service of
the Autonomous Province of Trento and by ITC-irst. Project leadership by the
Public Sector, in our opinion, among other advantages, helps tackling the issue
of potential conflicts of interests by private industries, see e.g. [13].
The project is multi-phased and is organized in various lines of activities
which strictly interact. For instance, in the first phase of the project, some func-
tional and non-functional requirements of the e-voting prototype, were built with
a strict round-trip between the sociological and the technological line, with the
normative line ensuring compatibility with the laws. See [19, 3] for more details
and [16] for some considerations related to the sociological aspects of e-voting.
Various trials have been conducted to assess the results of the first phase
of the project. The trials have had the goals of testing prototypes, evaluating
acceptance by citizens, ease of use, etc. So far more than 11.000 citizens have
tried the systems, either with experimental value (in four trials conducted in
parallel to local elections) or with legal value (election of the representatives of
the students in a local high school, involving about 1000 students).
For the second phase of the project, which will lead to a large-scale intro-
duction of the new voting system, aspects related to procedures, organization,
processes become more relevant, as they will serve both as the basis for the de-
ployment of the solution and for the definition of the laws that will govern the
electronic election.
With respect to scope, population, and participation, ProVotE is among the
largest, if not the largest, e-voting project in Italy.
2.2 Voting Procedures in Italy and e-voting Experimentations
Simplifying both on the law and on the procedures for the sake of presentation,
voting in Italy happens as follows:
1. Identification and registration of the voter. At the polling station the
voter is usually required to show his/her ID card and the electoral card. If
the name of the voter is present in the electoral list of the polling station,
the voter is registered, the electoral card stamped, and the voter is admitted
to voting.
2. Casting a vote. The voter is given a ballot and a pencil and is shown a
cabin where the vote can be cast in secrecy. Secrecy is both a right and a
duty. The Italian law and procedures are aimed at ensuring that the voter
cannot make his/her vote manifest to other people.
At the end of the voting day, the ballot boxes are opened and the counting
procedure starts:
3. Counting. Votes are counted and the results tabulated in special registers.
4. Transmission of the results. When all the ballots have been tabulated,
the results are transcribed in various paper documents and transmitted to
the offices responsible of aggregating all the data.
5. Sum and proclamation of the elected representatives. All the data
coming from the different polling stations are counted and seats assigned
according to algorithms defined by the law. Data are then made available to
the general public.
Various experimentations have been conducted in Italy to introduce new
technologies in the polling stations. The largest trial, so far, was sponsored by
the central government, and concerned a system for automating steps 3 and 4
above. The system, operated by specially appointed technicians, was installed in
47 precincts at the last European elections and repeated at the last political elec-
tions (2006). Little, however, is known about the results of the experimentation.
See [10] for some more details.
Proper e-voting experimentations (i.e. including step 2) have been conducted
at the local level, usually on a small scale, in experimentations which seem to
have had little continuity and/or on which information is scarce. We mention
San Benedetto del Tronto (2000), trials sites in Avellino (2001), Campobasso
(2001), Cremona (2002, 2006), Ladispoli (2004), Specchia (2005) [5, 6]. Other
experimentations have been conducted in Valle D’Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia,
and Milan.
2.3 Modelling Electoral Procedures in the UML
Electoral laws and procedures have strict security and traceability requirements
aimed at ensuring that frauds are extremely difficult to be undetected. To fulfill
such goal they define chains of responsibility and delegation, mechanisms for
monitoring procedures and mutual controls. Thus, for instance, in Italy, even
though the results of an election are available the next day, the confirmation
and officialisation of the results requires the Public Administration to perform
a strict series of checks, that can take up to a month after the election day.4
The introduction of new technologies in the polling stations not only changes
the way in which we cast votes, but also roles and responsibilities, often in
subtle ways (see e.g. [14].) For instance, the introduction of voting machines
may change the tools polling officers and representatives of the parties use to
verify the tabulation of data (think for instance of voting machines with no
printed trails, in use in some countries). In such a scenario, to maintain the
same security/verifiability requirements of a paper election, it may be necessary
to introduce various changes to the procedures (e.g. allow the parties and polling
officers to test the machines long before the election; provide ways to verify what
software is installed on the machines used during the election day).
To mitigate the risk of creeping security “holes” in the electronic procedures,
we decided therefore to provide extensive modelling of processes. The model of
the existing procedures provides a baseline for the definition of the new pro-
cedures, that have to be devised so that, to the best of our possibilities, the
following requirements are met:
– changes are as minimal as possible: we do not want to alter in “significant”
ways how elections are conducted;
4 Usually most of the issues raised involve identifying and dealing with material errors
of polling officers during the election day.
– the same security level of a paper election is maintained: that is, in an elec-
tronic election we can at least identify and mitigate the same “attacks” of a
paper election;
– the new threats introduced by electronic systems are dealt with by specifi-
cally devised procedures and checks.
To do so, we decided to provide detailed models of the current electoral processes
and devised a specific methodology, based on the UML, to support functional
analyst in modelling the applicative domain, while keeping uniform quality stan-
dards. The use of UML, in our case, was an essential requirement for various
reasons, among which: expertise, tool support and ease of understanding by the
domain experts.
Among the advantages of the definition of a methodology, we can mention the
possibility of performing (semi)automated analysis on the models. In particular,
we used VisualParadigm as the modelling tool and exploited the API it offers to
implement various extensions to perform custom analysis. Among the functions
we support, there is the possibility of extracting information on what actors are
responsible for what artifacts produced in an election (see [12] for more details).
3 Transition to Electronic Elections
Not surprisingly, there are different ways of modifying the existing procedures
(“as is”) in order to define procedures that support an electronic election (“to
be”) and satisfy the constraints mentioned above. Thus, the definition of the
exact procedure to be followed, among all the possible alternatives, should take
into consideration other requirements (e.g. economicity, efficiency, etc.) and be
based on mechanisms to weigh and evaluate the different choices.
However, the UML is weak in providing means of describing alternatives
and, by extension, the methodology we devised falls short in providing ways to
describe the why of the transition from the “as is” to a specific “to be”. Hence
the need to complement the UML modelling with some other approach more
suited to face these issues. Our proposal is to fill the gap that is left after the
application of the UML approach with Tropos.
Tropos [2] is an agent-oriented software development methodology, which is
requirements driven. The main entities that populate models in Tropos come
from the i* modelling approach [21], and comprise actors, goals and dependen-
cies (among actors and among goals); it reflects a mentalistic approach, thus
it models both humans and information systems as networks of interdependent
actors endowed with goals.
There are some features of Tropos that make it suitable to solve the problems
left open by the UML modelling activity.
Firstly, Tropos, differently from other similar methodologies, covers the very
early phases of requirements analysis, in which the analysis is centered on the
organizational environment where the software must operate, thus on the social
relations that preexist to the software and on the changes and improvements
that should incur to the environment when the software is introduced. On the
contrary, the UML model of the system “to be” shows how the voting scenario
changes after the introduction of the information system, but it cannot explain
why such changes have been introduced. Usually the rationale lies in some fea-
tures that the designer wants the new system to possess, i.e. in the requirements
of the new system. Thus, the application of Tropos to this phase has the purpose
to explain the reasons why the system is introduced.
Moreover, one of the analytical tools Tropos suggests is goal analysis [9], that
is put forward by modelling goal dependencies – whether the achievement of a
goal contributes to the achievement of another or it prevents it – and their de-
composition into subgoals, that can be an and-decomposition (all the connected
subgoals must be fulfilled in order to fulfill the root goal) or an or-decomposition
(the subgoals are alternatives: it is enough to fulfill one of them to achieve the
parent goal).
Some works, e.g. [9, 11, 20], use goal analysis to model the choice between
alternatives by combining or-decomposition and contribution between goals and
– by representing non-functional requirements as soft goals5 – help understanding
which choices favored more the satisfaction of a requirement.
Finally, an extension of Tropos, called Secure Tropos [8], has been proposed,
which specializes the Tropos dependencies in more security specific relations,
such as trust and delegation, within the same framework. This is also relevant
with respect to the present work, as security concerns are crucial for voting
scenarios.
Given all the features mentioned above, Tropos is a good candidate to com-
plement the UML modelling; but how does the integration of the two modelling
approaches take place concretely?
The idea is that of keeping each modelling approach to do just what is best
suited for, namely modelling processes on the one hand (UML), and doing goal
driven reasoning on the other (Tropos). Thus the UML models provide an exact
snapshot of the procedures (independently from the motivations for which they
have been devised in a specific way), while, at the same time, Tropos helps to
maintain track of the reasons for any change we had to introduce to support elec-
tronic elections. From a technical standpoint, this translates into an approach
which produces an alternating sequence of UML and Tropos models. In partic-
ular, the UML model is used at the “object” level to model processes. After the
UML model is given, Tropos is used at the “meta” level, to reason about design
alternatives with a twofold purpose:
1. to provide a rationale for the solutions adopted for the implementation of
the system “to be”, by modelling possible alternative ways of accomplishing
a goal;
2. to explore trust and security issues related to the e-voting process.
5 Soft goals are goals for which it is not straightforward to determine whether they have
been achieved or not. In this respect they are similar to non-functional requirements,
like security: there is no trivial way to decide if a system is secure or not.
The results of the analysis allow, in turn, to modify the existing UML model
and devise the new procedures that meet the goals stated in the Tropos model.
The steps described above are then iterated as needed.
Ideally speaking, every solution in the system “to be” should be taken after
having accurately explored all the alternative possibilities. In this case, the role
of the Tropos modelling is that of a visual tool that gives support to the people
involved in this decision-making by providing them with a general overview of
the choices under consideration, so that they could explore all the available
alternatives prior to choosing a solution.
In practice things are not so well methodologically applicable. Often these
decisions emerge from informal discussions and are constrained by stringent legal
requirements. However, even in these cases, given the involvement of different
stakeholders, the Tropos modelling is useful as it documents and represents the
motivation behind the choices. Finally, it can happen that, even in cases in
which some solution has already been chosen, once that all the alternatives
are represented, it comes out that some alternatives not previously considered
suit better the requirements. Thus, the Tropos modelling can also be seen as a
validation tool for the choices made.
So far we have seen the potentialities of the Tropos model; but, method-
ologically, how are the elements of the model chosen? If the main purpose of
the model is that of exploring, evaluating and eventually motivating choices be-
tween different alternative ways of accomplishing a goal with respect to a list of
requirements, the methodological questions amount to the following two:
1. how are the different alternatives singled out?
2. how are the requirements that provide the reference for evaluation selected?
The first question can be rephrased as follows: how to transform well es-
tablished procedures based on physical support, like pencils, sheets of paper,
cardboard boxes etc. in practices based on an electronic support? The possible al-
ternatives are constrained in many ways and these constraints come from several
dimensions: technological, legal and social. The main source for the formulation
of the alternatives have been the stakeholders of the project: interviews were
conducted with the development team that raised technological issues, other
interviews took place with the representatives of the Electoral Service of the
Province, who were mainly concerned with the compliance with the provincial
legislation regulating elections.
The second point, namely, the choice of the right requirements for reference
during evaluation of alternative choices, was not an easy task either. Some of
these requirements are strictly inherent to the information system itself, its fea-
tures and functionalities, and are relative to its technical performance. Other
requirements come from the interaction of the system with the environment and
are more related to the effects of the system on the organizational level.
The more general requirements, as maintainability or cost concerns, have
mainly been taken from the Software Engineering literature (for some references
see [17] and [4]); these represent properties that are desirable for any information
system. Other requirements are more specifically oriented to security issues, such
as confidentiality, integrity, availability, etc. (see, e.g., [4], Chap. 7). These are
particularly relevant in the e-voting scenario, since it is crucial that the system
is not vulnerable, otherwise there could arise major concerns, like results being
manipulated, or votes being associated to particular electors.
As mentioned above, security is not the only concern for the implementation
of an e-voting system. For other more specific requirements, as non-traceability
of votes or minimal change to the existing legislation, we also took inspiration
from existing work, such as, for instance (see, e.g., [18, 7]).
Finally, there is a very specific requirement that is peculiar of this very project
and that comes from the main objective of the project itself, namely the smooth
transition from the old paper system to the e-voting. This objective brings with
it a very stringent requirement, which is compliance with the existing legislation
on voting in the PAT (that is contained in [1]). This is a requirement that is im-
portant for several stakeholders (like, for instance, legislators, but also common
citizens), as changing the law is a (politically and bureaucratically) complex and
time consuming process. Moreover, the closer the new procedures are to the old
ones, the less the people involved in such procedures have to be instructed and
the lower the probability of mistakes is going to be.
4 Case Studies
In this section we will illustrate the approach described above with the help of
two examples. In these examples two activities, performed after elections are
finished, are concerned, namely, counting and transferring the processed data to
the Electoral office. Both examples concern modelling alternative choices, and
their evaluation and validation with respect to the non-functional requirements
the e-voting system should meet.
The examples we present here concern only one phase of the whole process,
the closing procedures. Moreover they abstract away various details, that, how-
ever, are of no relevance for the purpose of the example.
In the diagrams in Figures 1 and 2, i*/Tropos modelling notation is used [2,
21], with goals represented as ovals, and non-functional requirements (softgoals)
as clouds. As it was explained in the previous section, for a softgoal there are
no clear-cut criteria of whether it is achieved or not. We can only say that a
goal/softgoal contributes positively or negatively to the satisfaction of another
softgoal, which is graphically represented as an arrow with “+” or “-” on it,
respectively. Goals could be decomposed into or- or and-subgoals, which is also
represented in both figures.
A number of choices should be made when defining the procedures of e-
based ballot counting and data transfer. These choices are validated against the
following three groups of requirements.
– the ones which come from the e-voting domain, e.g. the need to provide
secrecy of voting, to avoid traceability of votes, to give to external observers
(representatives of political parties) certain control over the counting process,
to minimize the changes to the existing legislation imposed by the new e-
based procedure, etc.;
– “standard” system/software engineering requirements, such as maintainabil-
ity and cost concerns;
– security requirements, e.g. the ones related to confidentiality and secure data
transfer.
4.1 Counting
In Figure 1 the alternative choices for the counting procedure are analyzed
against a number of non-functional requirements.
At the end of the voting day results are accumulated, and either processed
locally, or the raw data are sent to the Electoral office and only there the count-
ing is performed. The latter choice has many drawbacks, as it is shown on the
diagram. For instance, counting the ballots centrally means first transferring the
unprocessed electronic ballots to the Electoral office, which appears to be not
only resource-consuming, but also dangerous from the security point of view.
The transferred data should be carefully protected against unauthorized access
and change by malicious users, as the voting results are not known yet. Also,
counting the results centrally limits external observers (representatives of politi-
cal parties) in their ability to control elections. Moreover, it does not comply with
the existing counting procedure and legislation, as in paper-based system bal-
lots are processed in each polling station and only after that they are forwarded
to the Electoral office. Thus, this possibility is not considered and ballots are
counted in place, i.e. locally in each polling station.
As far as, for the reasons of system availability, there are several voting
machines in each polling station, a number of alternatives should be considered.
Namely, counting could be performed either separately for each machine, or
the data from all machines are to be aggregated and only then processed. The
latter alternative, counting per polling station, complies with the existing paper-
based counting procedure, but requires additional effort to develop the data
aggregation mechanism. Counting the results separately on each machine is the
alternative adopted so far and used during the trials. This choice was made due
to the technical concerns such as, e.g., the easiness of the recovery from errors
(an error can be traced back to the concrete machine), or development cost
(there is no need to introduce a central processing point in each polling station).
However, this choice differs from the existing counting procedures meaning that
considerable changes to the existing legislation are necessary. This can be even
more problematic if we decide to make the results per each machine available
(full machine report vs. machine summary in the diagram). The point here is
that, according to the existing electoral law, no one could be able to know
partial results, but only the aggregated result per polling station. Having the full
machine report available contributes positively to the traceability of the votes,
which introduces the following conflict. On the one hand, traceability makes
it easier to trace and recover from errors, thus improving maintainability and
robustness of the whole system. On the other hand, the possibility to associate
Fig. 1. Counting: reasoning about alternative choices
a vote to the machine violates the secrecy of voting process making it easier to
trace one’s vote, which is a confidential piece of data.
4.2 Transferring Data
In Figure 2 the (partial) analysis of alternative choices and non-functional re-
quirements of the data transfer process is represented.
After the ballots are processed, the results should be sent to the central point,
i.e. to the Electoral office. In the e-voting system developed within ProVotE,
three kinds of resulting artifacts represent the voting results: electronic ballots
Fig. 2. Transfer data: reasoning about alternative choices
copied from a voting machine on a USB key6, the USB keys, and the paper
ballots produced by the voting machine printer. Electronic data are transferred
through a VPN to the central server, while USB keys and paper ballots are either
sent to the Electoral office or not (e.g. they might be kept somewhere locally, and
used only if some problems with the electronic data occur). Transferring only
electronic voting results makes the procedure easy to organize and control, but,
at the same time, makes the security issues very crucial. Namely, the connection
and the procedure of uploading the data on the server should be secure enough to
avoid malicious user intervention. Of course, security should not be ignored when
both the electronic data and USB keys and/or paper ballots are transferred, but
in this case it is less crucial as deliberate data inconsistencies can be detected
and fixed by comparing data on several media.
If a decision to send a USB key (one per each voting machine) to the Electoral
office is taken, another choice needs to be made. Should we copy the data from a
voting machine to the key, leaving a copy on the machine hard disk, or should we
move it, erasing the machine hard disk content? To move data means to reduce
6 Note that here we assume that one technological choice is already made – at the end
of an election day voting data (either processed or raw) are copied from each voting
machine on a special USB key, one for each machine.
the number of media which should be carefully protected against unauthorized
access, whereas to copy data means to double the number of vulnerable points.
On the other side, leaving the data copy on a voting machine contributes posi-
tively to system maintainability as it becomes easier to detect and recover from
errors.
A number of other choices concern paper ballots, which are sent to the Elec-
toral office either on a regular basis, or only if there is a problem in transferring
the other data media, or the results appear to be inconsistent. The choice we
consider here is about the processing of paper ballots: should they be counted
in a polling station, or only later, in the Electoral office, or even both? Unlike
the previous discussed choice, related to moving or coping data from a USB key,
these alternatives concern the organization of the new e-based voting process,
rather than technological issues. Counting the paper ballots in a polling station
requires more time and human resources, however, unlike counting centrally, it
allows the external observers to control the process. This last point might be
crucial as the interests of the representatives of political parties should also be
taken into account while designing the new voting system.
Both examples presented in this section illustrate the kind of analysis that
can be done using Tropos. They show how this modelling approach can com-
plement standard UML modelling by covering the aspects which UML is not
able to capture. With the help of Tropos models it is possible to represent all
the alternative choices considered when building the new electronically based
voting procedure. The models allow to analyze the impact that different alter-
natives have on the system security, maintainability, compliance with the elec-
toral laws, and many other issues. They support validating the taken decisions,
documenting the motivation behind them, and detecting conflicts an alternative
may introduce.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a modelling approach based on the integration
of UML and Tropos. The integration exploits complementary features of the two
modelling approaches and allows to maintain both an operational view of the
voting procedures and a visual approach to evaluate choices in designing the
electronic processes “to be”.
The methodology, whose definition has been motivated and driven by a spe-
cific need of the ProVotE project, is not restricted to the application domain and
we believe it should be easily applicable to other business process re-engineering
contexts.
Future works develop along different lines. From the UML point of view,
extensions of the tools to support automated analysis is a top-priority. From
the Tropos point of view, as already mentioned, we plan to build a trust and
delegation Secure Tropos model, which will be aimed at performing a security
check over the chosen solutions. Moreover, other improvements, which desirabil-
ity this experience has highlighted, can be obtained just by improving the Tropos
notation. For instance, it would be useful to be able to express (qualitatively)
different level of contribution of goals to softgoals; this is because very often in
complex scenarios like this, the same requirement can be favored by more than
one solution and the only way to be able to choose among these solutions is to
have a sort of “scale” of levels of contribution. Finally, in the present Tropos
model goals are conceived of as independent, while in real world they are very
often constrained (they must be achieved in a certain sequence, the achievement
of one can cause or prevent the achievement of another, etc.); the possibility of
expressing these constraints will significantly improve the power of the approach.
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